University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
2014

AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF RECIPROCITY AND
FORMAL CONTROLS WITH LABOR MARKET COMPETITION
Michael John Majerczyk
University of South Carolina - Columbia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons

Recommended Citation
Majerczyk, M. J.(2014). AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF RECIPROCITY AND FORMAL CONTROLS
WITH LABOR MARKET COMPETITION. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/2665

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF RECIPROCITY AND FORMAL CONTROLS
WITH LABOR MARKET COMPETITION
by
Michael John Majerczyk
Bachelor of Science
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2002
Master of Science
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2004
Master of Arts
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2006

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Business Administration
Darla Moore School of Business
University of South Carolina
2014
Accepted by:
Brad Tuttle, Dissertation Chair
Timothy Keune, Committee Member
Robert “Al” Leitch, Committee Member
Robert Ployhart, Committee Member
Lacy Ford, Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies

© Copyright by Michael John Majerczyk, 2014
All Rights Reserved.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to sincerely thank my dissertation chair, Brad Tuttle, for his
guidance, support, and time, as well as, my dissertation committee members, Tim Keune,
Al Leitch, and Rob Ployhart, for their time and valuable feedback.

iii

ABSTRACT
Most experimental research related to agency settings, such as participative
budgeting, has examined how formal controls, such as audits and reviews, influence the
behavior of managers. Alternatively, a growing literature in managerial accounting
examines the effects of using informal social controls. Some of these studies have
examined the ability of the gift-exchange model from economics, founded on reciprocity,
to function as a suitable control. Within the social context of an experimental labor
market, I examine the relationship between the type of control employers implement (i.e.,
reviews, a formal control versus reciprocity, an informal control) and the amount of
budget slack created by managers. Participants in the market make all hiring and control
implementation decisions, thereby providing an environment conducive for reciprocity. I
manipulate the labor market conditions at two levels – excess demand and excess supply.
I predict and find that the labor market conditions influence the type of control
implemented by employers. Employers appear to rely upon reciprocity more heavily
when excess supply exists in the labor market. However, managers fail to reciprocate
under either labor market condition to employer’s attempt to engage in a gift-exchange.
The implications of these findings with regard to both organizations and the academic
literature are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of control systems is to align the behavior of the manager with
employers’ objectives given the potential for agency problems. Employers face difficult
decisions regarding what controls to implement within the organization based on needs
and budget constraints. Formal controls can be effective but require the development of
procedures, maintenance, and the use of resources. Also, employers may consider the fit
of controls within the culture of the organization and the possibility that formal controls
could be perceived as intrusive or a challenge to autonomy (Christ et al. 2008). In
addition to the formal controls at employers’ disposal, employers can also rely on social
norms such as reciprocity.
In the economics literature the norm of reciprocity has been used to establish the
gift-exchange model which suggests employers can invoke behavior consistent with the
goals of the organization, including increased effort and decreased opportunistic
behavior, by offering higher than expected compensation (Akerlof 1982). Subsequent
research in the managerial accounting literature suggests that the gift-exchange model
can effectively function as a control (e.g., Hannan 2005; Zhang 2008; Kuang and Moser
2009; Kuang and Moser 2011; Chen and Sandino 2012). However, these studies have
focused on the gift-exchange model in isolation, ignoring formal controls that employers
typically implement. Thus, an important, unanswered question is how reciprocity fits in
the broader context of organizations’ formal control systems.
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The gift-exchange model, founded on reciprocity, is primarily concerned with
compensation. The importance of compensation in the gift-exchange model creates the
need to understand how the most important contextual variable in the setting of
compensation, i.e., labor market competition, affects how reciprocity will fit within
broader control systems. In a tight labor market, the agency dynamic may change. In
tight labor markets a gift-exchange becomes comparatively more expensive and
reciprocity can become more difficult to establish. The purpose of this study is to
examine the use and effectiveness of reciprocity as a control within varying levels of
labor market competition and when other formal controls are available to the employer.
I divide the examination of my research question between the decisions of the
employers (“use” of reciprocity/formal control) and the subsequent behavior of the
managers (“effectiveness” of reciprocity/formal control). I base my predictions on a
proposition that suggests reciprocity is easier to establish when there is excess supply in
the labor market compared to excess demand in the labor market. Based on this
proposition I predict that “gift” salaries will be offered with more regularity and formal
controls implemented with less regularity under excess supply compared to excess
demand. In short, I suggest the use of reciprocity and formal controls is affected by labor
market competition. I then make separate predictions for the effectiveness of each type
of control, reciprocity and formal controls. I develop my hypotheses based on the giftexchange model, founded on reciprocity, as well as prior findings related to formal
controls. In accordance with the gift-exchange model, I predict lower levels of
opportunistic behavior when managers receive higher salaries. I also predict based on
prior findings that implementation and presence of formal controls will lead to lower
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levels of opportunistic behavior. The hypotheses related to effectiveness can then be
analyzed to examine how reciprocity fits alongside formal controls.
Participants were recruited for a participative budgeting task in an experimental
setting consisting of employers and managers based on the trust game used in Evans et al.
(2001). Across multiple rounds employers hire managers who actively search for
available positions in a labor market with either excess demand (5 employers and 3
managers) or excess supply (3 employers and 5 managers). Consistent with the
requirements for reciprocity, the employer is given sufficient flexibility over the wage to
allow for the offering of a “gift” wage. In the budget task, managers submit a budget for
a project to be funded by the employer for which only the manager knows the actual cost.
This provides the manager with the ability to act opportunistically and build slack into the
budget or reciprocate any gift wage with a more accurate budget. Prior to the budget
task and upon clearing of the labor market, employers are allowed the choice to
implement a formal control in which the employer reviews the project budget prior to
funding the project. Alternatively, the employer can choose to rely on trust and
reciprocity by funding projects budgeted within reasonable cost constraints.
I find evidence that the form of the control system employers develop for
managers is heavily influenced by the labor market condition. Under excess demand,
employers pay significantly higher salaries and implement the formal control with more
regularity as predicted. Conversely, under excess supply, employers pay significantly
lower salaries, but offer larger gifts and implement the control less frequently, consistent
with my prediction that employers will rely more heavily on reciprocity under excess
supply. Results show that the implementation of the formal control represented by the
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review is equally effective across conditions in decreasing the level of slack. These
results suggest that identical controls with the same effectiveness and same cost may not
be implemented with the same regularity across employers depending on labor market
conditions. The most influential variable on slack taken is the decision to implement the
formal control, which significantly reduces slack taken and leads to increased
profitability for employers regardless of market condition. The gift was found to have no
effect on managers’ decisions to create slack, contrary to the predictions of the giftexchange model.
This study contributes to the current discussion over the relationship between
formal and informal controls. Currently in the managerial accounting and organizational
behavior literature there has been debate over the place of informal controls in
organizations. Some support an increased reliance on informal controls such as trust and
reciprocity (e.g., Das and Teng 2001; Christ et al. 2008). The gift-exchange model
represents one such means of relying on social norms (reciprocity); however we do not
yet know how reciprocity fits with other controls. My study provides empirical data
regarding the use and effectiveness of the gift-exchange model as a control when other
formal controls are at the employer’s disposal.
This study also contributes to the compensation and participative budgeting
literatures. This study expands our knowledge related to environmental factors outlined
in Dunk and Nouri (1998) by introducing a new relationship between labor market
competition and budget slack under different control systems into their theoretical
framework for participative budgeting. Currently, the environmental factors section of
the framework is notable for its brevity. In this study, the labor market is found to
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influence the agency setting. Results of this study will also provide assistance to firms in
their approach towards compensation and the use of formal controls. Given the
dependence on and competition for human capital, organizations are constantly aware of
the competition they face in the labor market. Despite the effectiveness of the formal
control, the findings suggest that consideration of the labor environment may lead to
implementation of formal controls with varying levels of frequency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as followed. Section II presents
background and states the proposition of the study. Section III describes the setting and
outlines the hypotheses of the study. Section IV details the experimental design used to
examine the predictions of the study. Section V presents the analysis and a discussion of
the results. Section VI provides a conclusion that includes implications and limitations
and future directions for research.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 THE GIFT-EXCHANGE MODEL AND RECIPROCITY
Our Akerlof (1982) outlined a model of gift-exchange that was established on the
principle of reciprocity. Reciprocity is an in-kind response to friendly or hostile acts
(Dohmen et al. 2009).1 Aklerlof (1982) suggested that through use of reciprocity,
employers can influence the behavior of managers through the level at which they set the
wage.2 In the gift-exchange model, managers are perceived to act more kindly towards
employers, in response to receiving what is perceived as high compensation for the task,
by taking actions consistent with employers’ preferences to provide higher performance.
Recent studies in the management accounting literature provide empirical data
regarding the validity of the gift-exchange model. Central to the premise of the giftexchange model, Hannan (2005) found that participants who were paid higher wages
reciprocated by providing greater effort. Kuang and Moser (2009) experimentally
compare an agency contract with a gift-exchange contract and find that effort is higher
under the gift-exchange contract when managers are aware employers had a choice
between the two contracts. This is consistent with reciprocity, in that managers reward
their employers when they perceive the employer has made a kind choice and suggests
1

While studies define reciprocity as an in-kind response (both positive and negative), references to the
norm of reciprocity have typically referred to positive reciprocity and rewarding kindness with equivalent
levels of kindness (Gouldner 1960).
2
For the purposes of this study the typical language of agency theory, principal and agent will be
substituted with employer and manager respectively. When it appears in this paper, manager should be
read as synonymous with employee not employer.
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that employers must be able to make the decision. Also, managers punish employers
when managers perceive the employer has made an unkind choice. Zhang (2008) further
examines the gift-exchange model as a form of control in a whistle-blowing setting,
finding that the gift-exchange model is applicable beyond simple effort settings. The
results of the above studies suggest that in isolation a reliance on a gift-exchange model,
founded on reciprocity, can potentially serve as an effective control in agency settings.
Chen and Sandino (2012) use archival data and find results consistent with the
theory that higher wages increase the honesty of employees, measured by employers’
incurrence of cash shortages and inventory shrinkage. However, no variable is included
in the model to allow for an understanding of reciprocity’s relationship with formal
controls. As with the experimental studies, Chen and Sandino (2012) provide evidence
only for the relationship between compensation and behavior. While the gift-exchange
model appears valid, its effectiveness within an organization’s broader control system
among the other forms of control is still not known.
When designing control systems, organizations must consider effectiveness, cost
and fit within the organization. Formal controls can be effective but they can also be
costly. Formal controls require the use of organizational resources beyond monetary
expenditures and the development and maintenance of procedures. It has also been
argued that formal controls can have qualitative costs. Christ et al. (2008) find that
controls can be perceived as intrusive and reduce managers’ perceptions of how well they
are trusted. They contend that formal controls can lead to decreased job satisfaction and
performance. While some argue that relying on adherence to social norms can replace
the need for formal controls, it may be the case that a gift-exchange makes formal
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controls more tolerable, making the two forms of control compliments rather than
substitutes.

2.2 LABOR MARKET COMPETITION AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL FACTOR
Compensation is central to the gift-exchange model. A major determining factor
of compensation is the labor market. A perfectly competitive labor market for managers
would consist of: 1) numerous employers, 2) numerous homogenous managers 3) “wagetaking” behavior on the part of employers and managers3 and 4) perfect, costless
information and labor mobility (McConnell et al. 2009). However, in the modern
economy perfectly competitive labor markets are the exception, not the rule (Manning
2011). Violation of any of the above characteristics contributes to market disequilibrium
and results in imperfect competition. Labor market competition in such cases can be
dichotomized between excess labor demand and excess labor supply. Manning (2011)
argues that in imperfect labor markets rents become prevalent.4
Economic models assume that in conditions of excess labor demand the
compensation provided to managers will be higher than when there is excess supply.
That is, managers are assumed to extract rent under conditions of excess demand in the
labor market. Conversely, employers rather than managers consume the rent under
conditions of excess supply in the labor market. The distribution of rents under
conditions of excess demand and excess supply in the labor market is associated with the
3

In a perfectly competitive market wages are set at the equilibrium wage. Based on the assumption of
numerous employers and managers “wage-taking” implies that no single employer or manager can cause a
movement in the equilibrium wage (Ehrenberg and Smith 2000).
4
In a market with excess demand, managers consume rent equal to the surplus over the minimum wage that
would be accepted to perform the task equivalent to the reservation wage, or opportunity cost in a perfectly
competitive labor market, for the manager (Ehrenberg and Smith 2000). This is consistent with the
definition of rent used by Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
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degree of exchange vulnerability (i.e. number and/or quality of alternatives available to
the other party) employers and managers have in the labor market.
In summary, labor markets with excess demand or excess supply create different
expectations regarding compensation. Thus, it is anticipated that these expectations will
create different reservations wages across markets. A reservation wage is the lowest
wage rate at which one would decide to accept employment. Specifically, based on
exchange vulnerability and expectations, I set forth the following proposition with
regards to managers in the labor market as a basis for my hypotheses to follow:
Proposition: Reservation wages will be higher when there is
excess demand in the labor market compared to when there
is excess supply in the labor market.

This proposition becomes important when viewed in terms of the gift-exchange
model. The higher the reservation wage, the more costly and potentially difficult it is for
employers to establish reciprocity.
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CHAPTER 3
SETTING AND HYPOTHESES
3.1 PARTICIPATIVE BUDGETING
Participative budgeting allows firms to take advantage of the private information
of managers when planning and allocating resources by involving managers in the
budgeting process. Compared to employers, managers are assumed to possess relevant
information regarding such things as competitor positioning, customer preferences and
resource needs based on proximity to the operations that is not possessed by employers
(Chow et al. 1988; Fisher et al. 2002; Hannan et al. 2006). Additionally, managers are
often more specialized in the area of production and would be expected to have superior
budget pertinent knowledge as a result of the acquisition of skill or experience on the job
or through training. This information asymmetry makes managers valuable participants
in the budgeting process with the objective of efficient and effective resource
allocation. However, this information asymmetry allows for opportunistic behavior on
the part of managers in the form of budget slack.
Budget slack occurs when targets are deliberately set lower than the “best-guess
forecast” (Merchant and Van der Stede 2012). 5 Conceptually, budget slack is a rent
extracted by the manager in that slack increases the wealth of self-interested managers at

5

Budget slack is not necessarily limited to opportunistic behavior. Budget slack can also be used as a
guard against uncertainty (Merchant and Manzoni 1989). Dunk and Nouri (1998) identify slack as any
intentional underestimation of production capabilities or overestimation of costs. By holding uncertainty
constant in this study slack represents a rent and can be considered opportunistic behavior consist with the
definition of Dunk and Nouri (1998).
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the expense of employers. The typical treatment of slack in experimental research has
been to consider slack as available income for managers that comes at the expense of
employers (e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Fisher et al. 2006; Rankin et al. 2008; Schatzberg and
Stevens 2008; Hannan et al. 2010). This treatment clearly classifies budget slack as
opportunistic and self-interested.
Agency theory provides the benchmark model for opportunistic behavior within
participative budgeting settings (Brown et al. 2009). Agency theory assumes selfinterested, opportunistic behavior and that parties will always take advantage of other’s
exchange vulnerabilities (Baiman 1990). Behavior is opportunistic to the extent that it
takes advantage of another’s exchange vulnerabilities (Barney and Hansen 1994). The
opportunistic behavior most associated with participative budgeting is the creation of
budget slack (Dunk and Nouri 1998). Particularly when compensation is linked to
budgets, agency models predict that managers will build slack into the budget creating a
need for controls. Controls can take the form of either formal controls or reliance on
social norms, including reciprocity. The current lack of consensus on the prescribed way
to mitigate slack makes participative budgeting an interesting setting for examining my
research question. The ability of managers to act both kindly (by reporting honestly) or
unkindly (by creating slack) make the participative budgeting setting appropriate for
examining my research question.

3.2 “USE” HYPOTHESES
My research question consists of two dimensions. I will begin by discussing my
predictions related to the “use” dimension of my research question. “Use” refers to the
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decisions of the employer regarding composition of the control systems when employers
are free to both use formal controls and/or engage in a gift-exchange with regards to the
compensation level. This is a more sophisticated analysis of reciprocity than prior studies
and better reflects the actual context in which a gift-exchange will be used.
Prior research in both accounting and economics has found that employers
attempt to engage in a gift-exchange when given authority over the salary (e.g., Charness
2004; Kuang and Moser 2009). This suggests that employers acknowledge the potential
of higher compensation to act as a control. The gift offered by employers is a forfeiture
of rents that could otherwise be extracted by the employer. Standard labor economics
theory predicts higher compensation levels when there is excess demand in the labor
market compared to when there is excess supply in the labor market. Under excess
demand, managers expect to receive rents, while employers extract rent under excess
supply. Therefore, under excess supply employers have a larger reserve from which to
make gifts. The higher cost and smaller pool of rents for employers under excess demand
compared to excess supply is likely to lead to less effort at engaging in a gift-exchange in
labor markets with excess demand. From the manager’s perspective, higher base salaries
under excess demand make the same nominal gift as offered under excess supply less
motivating because the proportion of compensation that is a gift is lower under excess
demand.
The theory of reciprocity provides further, perhaps stronger, justification for
predicting the use behavior of employers under varying labor market conditions. As
outlined in the proposition of this study, and consistent with expectations based on
standard labor economic theory, reservations wages of managers is assumed higher under
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excess demand than excess supply. This suggests not only a greater cost to offering a gift
under excess demand, but greater difficulty in communicating the gift as well.
For reciprocity to be invoked, managers must perceive the compensation offered
as consisting of a gift (Falk and Fischbaucher 2006). When competition is introduced the
ability to communicate the gift becomes more difficult. The tighter the labor market, the
more competitive salary offers must be. It is likely then that managers will fail to
interpret high compensation offers as a gift, instead attributing the level of compensation
entirely to the competition in the labor market. Conversely, under excess supply,
managers’ expectation is for low compensation. Any compensation offered above the
expected amount would be perceived as a gift by the manager and invoke a responsibility
to reciprocate. Therefore, both cost concerns and the theory of reciprocity give the same
directional prediction.
H1:
“Gift” offers will be higher when there is excess
supply in the labor market than when there is excess
demand in the labor market.

For this discussion it is important to keep in mind that a gift is a distinct construct
from compensation itself. The gift represents the surplus of compensation above the
amount necessary to attract the manager to the position. In essence the gift is employers
relinquishing part of the rent expected to be received. H1 predicts that employers in labor
markets with excess supply are more likely to attempt to engage in a gift-exchange with
managers because these employers can more easily convey the gift and invoke
reciprocity. The theory of sequential reciprocity argues that subsequent actions can either
act to undo or strengthen the compulsion to reciprocate to an initially kind act
(Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004).
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Considering the perceptions of managers that formal controls impair autonomy,
imply distrust, and are intrusive, implementation of the formal control is more likely to
undo rather strengthen managers’ compulsion to reciprocate. This suggests, in
accordance with the theory of sequential reciprocity, that the formal control will be
implemented less frequently in labor markets with excess demand compared to labor
markets with excess supply. Employers can then rely upon the reciprocity that has been
established without concern for undoing the perceptions of kindness and trust associated
with the higher gift offers under excess supply.
H2:
A formal control will be implemented with less
frequency when there is excess supply in the labor market
than when there is excess demand in the labor market.
Taken together H1 and H2 examine the employers’ decisions regarding the
composition of the control system under varying labor market conditions. The
interrelated nature of H1 and H2, suggest that the effect predicted by H2 is mediated by
the size of the gift offer. Support for both these hypotheses, and evidence of mediation,
provides strong support for a greater attempt by employers to rely upon reciprocity under
excess supply.

3.3 “EFFECTIVENESS” HYPOTHESES
Next, I discuss the predictions related to the effectiveness dimension of my
research question. “Effectiveness” refers to the behavior of managers within the agency
setting. In a participative budgeting setting, an effective control is one that reduces slack
creation. Managers’ behavior is a reaction to the control decisions related to employers’
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use of reciprocity and formal controls. I formulate predictions of behavior under both
types of control and then provide a discussion of the interpretation of the possible results.
In a participative budgeting setting, slack is opportunistic behavior on the part of
managers who take advantage of their private information. The goal of the organization
in incorporating the manager into the budgeting process is to receive accurate reporting.
Slack represents an “unkind” action, while honest, accurate reporting represents a “kind”
action consistent with the goals of the organization. According to reciprocity a manager
responds kindly to a kind act from the employer.
Consistent with the gift-exchange model, founded on reciprocity, offering a gift to
managers in the form of higher compensation (a kind act by the employer) will lead to
behavior consistent with the goals of the organization (a kind act by manager). In
compensation offers, the gift is a kind act by the employer intended to invoke reciprocity
from the manager. If the gift-exchange model is an effective control, in a budget
context, then slack will be reduced when employers engage in the gift-exchange.
Consistent with prior literature and after controlling for the salary differences across
levels of labor market competition, I predict:
H3:
The amount of slack created by managers will be
inversely related to the size of the “gift” offer made by
employers.

The purpose of formal controls is to reduce opportunistic behavior and align
behavior of the managers with the goals of the organization. Unlike the gift-exchange
model that relies on conformity to social norms, formal controls can assume opportunistic
behavior will occur but attempts to curb such behavior through elimination of the
opportunity, reducing economic incentives, or punishment of the action. Related to the
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first method, eliminating opportunity, prior literature has found that formal controls such
as reviews and probabilistic audits have been successful in deterring opportunistic
behavior in participative budgeting settings. Employer scrutiny is a common control in
budget settings. For example, a manager may be given freedom to spend or budget
within an allowable range, such as a hurdle rate. On the other hand, an employer may
expand the formal controls and the manager may be required to submit all spending and
budget requests for review. I expect the latter case to result in lower slack. While a
range may imply flexibility and leniency, a specific review implies a demand for
accuracy. Requirement to report a definitive, accurate cost requires the manager to
knowingly act dishonestly. Prior literature has found that individuals experience
disutility from being dishonest (Evans et al. 2001; Rankin et al. 2008). In addition,
managers must always fear rejection of their budget (Rankin et al. 2008). The
combination of these effects lead to the expectation of lower slack in the presence of a
formal control such as a review.
H4:
The amount of slack created by managers will be
lower when formal controls are implemented compared to
when the employer chooses to forego the implementation
of the formal controls.

Taken together H3 and H4 examine the effectiveness of reciprocity as a control
when other formal controls are also at the employer’s disposal. If H3 is supported it
suggests that the observed effect from prior studies that reciprocity can function as a
control holds. When examined together, if both H3 and H4 are supported it would
suggest that reciprocity and formal controls can be used complimentarily. If H3 is
supported and H4 is not supported, it would suggest that reciprocity serves as a superior
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alternative to formal controls. If H3 is not supported while H4 is supported, it would
suggest that reciprocity does not maintain the ability to function as a suitable control
when in the presence of other formal controls such as a review.
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CHAPTER 4
METHOD
4.1 OVERVIEW
In order to test my hypotheses, I develop an experimental labor market in which
managers seek employment and employers make offers to managers. Hence, I am able to
create employer/manager relationships capable of facilitating reciprocity. After a wage
offer is accepted, employers decide whether to implement an additional costly control in
the form of final authority over the budget submitted by the manager. The basic task
closely follows the trust game developed in Evans et al. (2001). The experiment was
administered using the Z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007).
Participants are seated at individual computer stations and randomly assigned to
the role of either a manager or employer. Participants maintain the same role for the
duration of the session and are not identifiable to other participants eliminating the
creation of reputation concerns. Participants retain anonymity for the duration of the
session and are instructed not to communicate outside of the requirements of the study
and are not able to reveal identifying characteristics during the study.
Each session consists of ten rounds.6 Each round consists of a labor market used
to establish the employer/manager relationship, followed by performance of the basic
project budget task. Upon completion of the round, managers and employers are
6

Technical issues with one of the excess supply sessions resulted in only seven rounds being conducted.
These observations are included in all analysis. Inclusion of these sessions does not strengthen any of the
results in the study.
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presented with their respective earnings from the round. Upon completion of the tenth
round, participants complete a post-experimental questionnaire consisting of
demographic questions, manipulation checks and process measures. Participants are
provided compensation consisting of $5 for showing up and the compensation earned
from one randomly selected round with an exchange rate of $1 for every fifty Lira (the
experimental currency in the study).7 A session lasts between 70 and 80 minutes.
Participants in the study were paid an average of $16.83.

4.2 MANIPULATED VARIABLE
Labor market competition is manipulated between-subjects at two levels, excess
demand or excess supply. In the excess labor demand (supply) condition, three
participants are assigned as managers (employers) and five participants are assigned as
employers (managers).

4.3 MEASURED VARIABLES
Two measured variables function as dependent measures for the testing of H1 and
H2 and the independent variables in the testing of H3 and H4. The first measured
variable is the size of the gift offered by employers. Employers make new offers in each
round. The size of the offer made is at the discretion of the employers. Managers then
chose to accept or reject any offers at their discretion. The following equation gives the
∑

formula for the “gift” calculation:

7

,

Participants also received extra credit for recruiting purposes for attendance in addition to the $5 show-up
fee.

19

where

is the round,

equals the number of rounds in the session8, is the individual

employer and is the labor market (either Excess Demand or Excess Supply).
The second measured variable, implementation of an additional formal control, is
endogenously determined by employers who decide to either implement or forgo a costly
additional control. If the employer chooses to implement the control, the employer
reviewed the budget submitted by the manager (at a cost to both the manager and the
employer) and is the option to not fund the project. If the employer chooses to forego the
control, the manager is constrained to submit a budget within the range of possible costs
determined by the existing control system, but the employer cannot review the budget
and the project was automatically funded.

4.4 DEPENDENT MEASURES
The primary dependent measure of interest in this study (slack taken) is the
amount of slack creation by managers and serves as the dependent variable in the tests of
H3 and H4. Rankin et al. (2008) argue that requiring a factual assertion as done in this
study allows for the interpretation of any slack as a form of dishonesty, thereby
representing opportunism. The dependent measure takes the following form:
.9 Budget slack is the difference between the budget
submitted by each manager and the actual cost of the project. The available slack is the
difference between the highest cost in the range of possible costs known by the employer
(from the existing control system) and the actual cost known by the manager. For
8

The multiple rounds in the design of the study require the use of repeated measures analysis for all
variables.
9
This measure is consistent with the dependent measure used in Rankin et al. (2008) and is the complement
of the honesty measure used in other studies.
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example, if the actual cost is 4,600, and the highest cost in the range of possible costs is
5,000, the available slack is 400.

4.5 DESIGN
Each round within a session consists of two sequential phases. The first phase is a
contracting phase designed to elicit the “use” dimension of the research question and
presented the labor market conditions to the participants.10 The second phase is a
budgeting phase and is designed to examine the “effectiveness” dimension of the research
question. Figure 4.1 provides a summary of the decision tree and payoff structure related
to Phase 2 of the study.
Employers are endowed with 500 Lira to begin each round. All salaries are paid
to managers from the initial endowment of the employer.11 Employers make offers
sequentially to each manager until a manager accepts the offer or no new managers
remain to receive offers. All offers are made in a random sequence that is predetermined.
Managers and employers vary in their position within the order of offers to be made and
received each round, with the possibility that some managers under excess supply do not
receive offers and some employers under excess demand do not have their offers
distributed in a given market.12 Once an offer is accepted the manager and employer left

10

Participants remain in the same condition (i.e., excess demand or excess supply) for all rounds of the
session.
11
This adaptation to the Evans et al. (2001) design is consistent with Douthit and Stevens (2012) who argue
that it captures the idea that managers rarely have exact knowledge of employer’s wealth and alleviates
concerns of equal-split fairness.
12
For example, assume five employers and three managers (excess demand). The round will begin with
the first employer makes an offer to the first manager, the second employer makes an offer to the second
manager and the third employer makes an offer to the third manager. If the first and third manager accept
the offers, but the second manager declines, then the second employer will be out of the market and the
second manager will receive an offer from the fourth and then fifth employer until the second manager has
accepted an offer from one of the employers or rejected all offers.
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the market and progress to the second phase of the round. Managers receive
compensation of 200 Lira and sit idle for the duration of the round if they do not receive
or accept any employer’s offer.13 Employers receive 350 Lira from their initial
endowment if their offer was not accepted.
Following the establishment of the salary and the acceptance of an offer by
managers, employers decide whether to implement an additional costly control in the
form of a review before the start of the second phase. Specifically, if employers choose
to implement the control, employers are charged 125 Lira and review the budget
submitted by the manager before deciding to fund the project. In the event the control is
implemented, managers are charged 25 Lira. Employers communicate the control
decision to the manager through one of two statements: For the implement option, “You
will be responsible for submitting a budget that is within the possible range of costs. I
have decided your budget will require my approval once submitted.” For the forego
option, “You will be responsible for submitting a budget that is within the possible range
of costs. I have decided your budget will require no further approval once submitted.”
The second phase of the round is a budgeting phase. In this phase the manager
submits the project budget to the employer. The cost of the project is known to be
between 4,000 Lira and 5,500 Lira according to the employer’s existing control system.
The actual cost is randomly predetermined and is revealed only to the manager who is
responsible for submitting the budget to the employer.14 The employer is only aware of
the possible cost range (from 4,000 Lira to 5,500 Lira). The revenue is set at 5,800 Lira
13

The 200 Lira represents the suggested reservation wage. In keeping with the proposition of the paper, the
reservation wage is not binding as in prior studies (e.g., Brandts and Charness 2004), allowing for
participants to develop their own personal reservation wage.
14
Three sets of actual costs were randomly selected using a random number generator in excel to avoid and
control for potential order effects.
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in every round. Because there is no uncertainty in the actual cost for the manager,
budgets submitted constitute a factual assertion.
If a control is implemented, the employer subsequently makes the decision
whether or not to fund the project after receiving the manager’s budget, otherwise, if no
control is in place the project is funded automatically upon submission of the budget. If
the project is funded, then the manager receives the full amount of the budget including
any slack as compensation. The employer receives the revenue amount minus the
submitted budget amount plus any remaining funds from the initial endowment not
offered to the manager for salary. The manager keeps as earnings any slack (i.e., the
difference between the budget and the actual cost). These earnings come at the direct
expense of the employer. If the project is not funded, the manager receives the salary
minus the cost of the review and the employer kept any endowment minus salary plus
225 Lira (the 350 Lira revenue minus the 125 Lira review cost).

4.6 PARTICIPANTS
Ninety-six participants were recruited from upper-level accounting courses and all
had at least completed an introduction to managerial accounting course.15 Given the
simplified nature of the budget task upper-level students possess sufficient capabilities to
perform the task. Thirty-nine percent of the sample was male and the average age was
21.18 years. The use of this participant pool is consistent with the pool used in previous

15

Of these 96 observations, only 88 are included in the analysis. One session of the excess supply
condition was forced to end after only four rounds were completed because of a problem with the network.
A second excess supply condition was forced to end after completing seven rounds based on a network
problem but these observations remain in the analysis.
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studies in participative budgeting (e.g., Fisher et al. 2006; Rankin et al. 2008; Hannan et
al. 2010; Douthit and Stevens 2012).
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FIGURE 4.1 – EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS
The first three hypotheses in this study relate to the employer’s decision over the
control system. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 provide graphical summaries of the decisions.
As can be seen, there is a noticeable divergence between the average accepted salary
across conditions, as well as a noticeable disparity in the frequency with which the formal
control was implemented by employers. This provides initial support for the argument
that control systems will in part be shaped by the conditions in the labor market.
Additionally, Figure 5.3 shows the level of slack taken based on the control decision
within labor market conditions. Table 5.1 provides summary descriptive statistics.
Consistent with the proposition of the study, the reservation wage varied
significantly based on labor market condition. As part of the post-experimental
questionnaire managers in both markets were asked the lowest salary they would have
accepted. The consolation earnings of 200 Lira in the experimental design acted as a
baseline for the reservation wage. In the excess supply condition the average reservation
wage of participants was 199.833. In the excess demand condition the average
reservation wage of participants was 332.778. Using a t-test this difference is statistically
significant (P-value < 0.0001). The reservation wage under excess supply is not
statistically distinguishable from the baseline reservation wage (P-Value = 0.9435).
However, under excess demand the reservation wage varies significantly from the
baseline reservation (P-Value < 0.0001). Thus, the proposition of the study, that
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reservation wages are higher under excess demand, is supported. Next, I analyze the
predictions of the hypotheses.

5.1 TEST OF HYPOTHESES – “USE”
As shown in Figure 5.1, the average salary varied significantly between market
conditions as predicted by standard economic theory. In excess supply the average
accepted salary was 276.61 while in the excess demand condition the average accepted
salary was 409.06 (P-value < 0.0001). The “gift” portion of the salary constitutes the
difference between the offer and the minimum salary that would be accepted by the
manager. The minimum offer, as discussed in the analysis of the proposition, varied
significantly across conditions. H1 predicts that the gift offered by employers will be
higher under excess supply than excess demand. To measure the “gift” a proportion is
used. The average reservation wage as established by the process measures was
subtracted from the average offer made by the employers over the course of the session
and this difference was divided by the reservation wage to form a proportion. The
following equation gives the formula used:
∑

, where

is the round,

equals the

number of rounds in the session, is the individual employer and is the labor market
(either Excess Demand or Excess Supply). Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics of the
gift measure. Under excess supply the gift proportion is significantly higher under excess
supply (mean = 0.375) than excess demand (mean = 0.153) (P-Value = 0.0061, onetailed). Thus, H1 is supported. Managers receive a higher proportion of their salary in
the form of a gift under excess supply compared to excess demand.
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H2 predicts that the labor market will affect the employer’s decision to implement
the formal control. Given the categorical nature of the dependent variable, a repeated
measures logistic regression was performed. The dependent variable is Control, which
takes the value of 1 if the formal control is implemented and 0 if the formal control is not
implemented. Because the relationship between the labor market and the control decision
is predicted to be mediated by the gift I conduct a mediation analysis consistent with
Baron and Kenny (1986). The models and results of the tests are provided in Table 5.3 –
5.5. First, I test the main effect for H2 using the labor market as the independent
variable.16 I use a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for excess demand and 0 for
excess supply. As predicted, employers under excess supply implement the control less
frequently than under excess demand (P-value = 0.0014, two- tailed), supporting H2.
To test the mediation, I conduct additional tests. Figure 5.4 presents the model of
the mediation. As already observed in the discussion of H1 the relationship between
labor market competition and the gift is significant. I next test the relationship between
the gift and the control decision and find that in fact an inverse relationship is present.
The higher the gift proportion the less likely the formal control will be implemented (PValue = 0.0001). This result holds regardless of condition. Under excess demand the Pvalue is 0.0201 and under excess supply the P-value is 0.0162. In order to demonstrate
mediation, the paths must all be significant, and when the mediating variable is
introduced into the model, the main effect must disappear. Since the mediation paths are
significant as observed in Table 5.1 and Table 5.4, I compare the results of Table 5.3 and
5.5. In the final model (shown in Table 5.5), both market condition and gift proportion

16

Period was included as a control variable in all tests related to the mediation. No significant period effect
was found in any test and therefore the variable is left untabulated and is not discussed.
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are included in the model and the market condition loses significant (P-value = 0.2336,
two-tailed). This provides further support for H2 and demonstrates that the effect of the
labor market on the control decision is mediated by the gift.

5.2 SUMMARY – “USE”
In both markets (excess supply and excess demand) managers seem to attempt to
engage in a gift-exchange, because in both markets wages significantly exceed managers’
reservation wages. However, the gift proportion is significantly higher in the excess
supply condition as predicted based on greater ability to invoke reciprocity. Consistent
with the ability to invoke reciprocity more easily under excess supply, I find support that
employer reliance upon the gift-exchange model does appear higher in excess supply
compared to excess demand. The support for H2 and the mediation process suggests that
employers did believe that offering higher salary required less need for the formal control
and that employers did attempt to engage in a gift-exchange.

5.3 TEST OF HYPOTHESES – “EFFECTIVENESS”
H4 and H5 examine the behavior of managers within the given control system
used by employers analyzed in the previous section. To test these hypotheses, I use a
repeated measures mixed model. Table 5.5 provides the results of the test. To be
consistent with prior literature the actual cost was included as a control variable. Given
the multiple rounds, period was also included as a control variable.17

17

In untabulated results, period was included in the model and periods 1and 10 were significant at the .05
significance level. Removing these periods from the data and running only the remaining seven rounds
maintains the significance effects on the variables of interest while cost goes from a P-value of 0.0937 to
0.3017. Models including interactions between the gift proportion and control decision were conducted,
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Based on the gift-exchange model, H4 predicts that larger gifts paid by employers
will lead to lower levels of slack creation by managers. However, there is no support for
such a relationship between the gift and the amount of slack taken (P=0.9252). In fact,
when analyzing the correlation between conditions, a positive relationship is actually
found between gift and the level of slack created in the excess demand market (0.314, Pvalue < 0.0001). No correlation is found between the salary and the level of slack
created in the excess supply market (0.065, P-value = 0.4528). Therefore, H4 is not
supported by the data.
H5 explores the other component of the control system, the formal control
decision. H5 predicts that the presence of the formal control will reduce the creation of
slack by managers. Again, control decision is used as a categorical variable taking the
value 1 when the formal control is implemented and 0 when the formal control is not
implemented. This time control is the independent variable in the model with slack taken
as the dependent measure. I find that control is significantly related to the amount of
slack taken (P-Value < 0.0001). Thus, H5 is supported. Figure 4 shows the
effectiveness of the formal control across conditions. There is no evidence that the
formal control is more or less effective in either labor market condition.

5.4 SUMMARY – “EFFECTIVENESS”
The support for H5 and lack of support for H4 suggests that the effectiveness of
the gift-exchange model and reciprocity as a control is diminished when incorporated into
a broader control system that features the ability to implement formal controls. There is

but no significant interaction was observed and the models performed comparatively worse to the model
used in this discussion.
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no evidence that managers attempt to reciprocate higher salaries with lower opportunism.
In fact, under excess demand higher salaries seem to encourage greater opportunism.
The finding for H4 is a direct contradiction of the predictions of the gift-exchange model.
However, previous studies related to the gift-exchange model have made compensation
the only control component of the control system. Additionally, the observed correlation
under excess demand lends credibility to the argument that managers’ are more
opportunistic under excess demand. As in prior studies the formal control effectively
reduces slack below levels observed in the absence of the formal control.
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FIGURE 5.1 – AVERAGE ACCEPTED SALARY BY ROUND
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FIGURE 5.2 – FREQUENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FORMAL CONTROL BY
ROUND
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FIGURE 5.3 – AVERAGE SLACK TAKEN ACROSS CONDITIONS
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FIGURE 5.4 – MODEL OF “USE” DIMENSION
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TABLE 5.1 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Excess Supply
Excess Demand
Number of Employers
15
30
Number of Managers
25
18
Average Salary Accepted
276.61 (87.94)
409.06 (70.56)
Frequency of Formal
44.12%
61.85%
Control
Average Slack Created
0.606 (0.347)
0.597 (0.329)
Reservation Wage
199.833 (49.99)
332.778 (78.87)
Gift Proportion
0.375 (.378)
0.153 (0.193)
Mean (standard deviation)
Total observations for repeated measures variables (n= 309)
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TABLE 5.2 – SUMMARY OF GIFT PROPORTION ACROSS CONDITIONS
Number
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

Excess Supply
15
0.375
0.378
-0.042
1.209

t-test = 6.86, P-Value = 0.0061
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Excess Demand
30
0.153
0.193
-0.193
0.466

TABLE 5.3 – FREQUENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FORMAL CONTROL
(MAIN EFFECT)
Variable
Intercept
Excess Supply
Excess Demand

Estimate
0.5567
-0.1786
0.0000

Standard Error
0.0935
0.0560
.
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χ2
35.47
10.18
.

P-Value
<0.0001
0.0014
.

TABLE 5.4 – FREQUENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FORMAL CONTROL
(MEDIATOR)
Variable
Intercept
Gift Proportion

Estimate
0.7007
-0.5329

Standard Error
0.1388
0.2292
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Z
5.05
-2.32

P-Value
<0.0001
0.0201

TABLE 5.5 – FREQUENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FORMAL CONTROL
(FULL MODEL)
Variable
Intercept
Excess Supply
Excess Demand
Gift Proportion

Estimate
0.6369
-0.1271
0.0000
-0.3330

Standard Error
0.0942
0.1067
.
0.1097
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Z
6.76
-1.19
.
-3.03

P-Value
<0.0001
0.2336
.
0.0024

TABLE 5.6 – THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROLS ON SLACK CREATION
Effect
Intercept
Excess Supply
Excess Demand
Gift Proportion
Cost
No Control
Control

Estimate
-0.02989
-0.03038
0.00000
0.07341
0.00011
0.1849
0.00000

Standard Error
0.3351
0.03724
.
0.05575
0.00007
0.03769
.
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DF
41
41
.
254
254
39
.

t Value
-0.09
-0.82
.
1.32
1.68
4.91
.

P-Value
0.9294
0.4193
.
0.1891
0.0937
<0.0001
.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The study examines an environmental factor that confronts all organizations –
labor market competition. In this study employers are given complete control over the
agency contract they wished to implement within a competitive labor market
environment. The results of this study appear to contradict the prevailing findings in the
literature suggesting that reciprocity is an effective means of control. However, this
study allowed for a more expansive test of the effectiveness of relying on reciprocity in
two important ways. First, employers were forced to compete in a competitive labor
market in which employers and manager had to actively search to form the agency
relationship. Second, employers were provided with control options that have been
demonstrated as effective (Rankin et al. 2008; Stevens and Schatzberg 2008). These two
variations from prior gift-exchange studies are likely to have affected the behavior of
managers.
The results suggest that while employers appear to attempt to engage in a giftexchange, managers are not responsive. The inverse relationship between salary and
frequency of implementation of the formal control is consistent with a reciprocity
framework. The fact that employers that already incur the greater cost (i.e., employers
competing in labor markets with excess labor demand) are more likely to implement the
costly formal control supports the idea that employers tried to engage in a gift-exchange
rather than conserve on cost. Managers however are significantly more opportunistic
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when the formal control is absent and do not display any reciprocity to increased
compensation levels.
The findings of this study have potential implications across a broad number of
research areas in management accounting, including the literature on controls, effort,
honesty, negotiation, and performance. Future research can apply the constructs and
conclusions of the present study to determine what attributes generalize beyond the
participative budgeting literature and what attributes are specific to the budgeting setting.
Within the participative budgeting literature, this study expands the theoretical
framework proposed by Dunk and Nouri (1998).
While the use of experimental methods in this study potentially limits the
generalizability of results, the use of a controlled experiment allows for greater validity
related to the relationships of the construct of interest. The task selected in the current
study has been externally validated by use in prior research and allows for reasonably
analogous setting to that faced by managers. The task selected in the current study also
allows for upper-level accounting students to serve as reliable participants. As in any
experiment, caution must be made when attempting to generalize beyond the participant
pool of the study.
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